Saturday, July 24, 2004
Re: Bush's Bronze Star
sol Kline <solk@webtv.net>
How worried were you when Clinton was President. He aborhed the U Smilitary before he became the commander of all the armed forces. Did youdisparged him at any time?Maybe you should take one of those cruises out of Boston during the"left wing" convention--a very long one!
Email reply
A former active army NCO here who was drafted in 1972, just after graduatingfrom college.
I finished basic training in March 1973, just before the last of our troopswere pulled out of Vietnam. Among my duty assignments were with the 24th,82nd and the TOPO command in West Germany.
I think I've an earned right tojudge the president's military record, or lack thereof.President's Clinton management of the military seemed to be good enough to establish the best military in the history of the world and was well used-orabused-by president Bush. More to the point and has been well documented,Bush is close to destroying the Army I served for so long.
I suggest you visit Army Times to see what the troops are saying. As we used to say in the NCO club, if you've got a free stake, it's easy toplay.
Bush has never, ever put himself on the line, and that is the simpletruth. And while I'll miss the "left wing' convention, in Boston, I mighttry to make the "right wing" one in New York. My uniform still fits very well.
Best regards,
Peter J. Roberts
Editor and Publisher
Newenglandwow.com
How worried were you when Clinton was President. He aborhed the U Smilitary before he became the commander of all the armed forces. Did youdisparged him at any time?Maybe you should take one of those cruises out of Boston during the"left wing" convention--a very long one!
Email reply
A former active army NCO here who was drafted in 1972, just after graduatingfrom college.
I finished basic training in March 1973, just before the last of our troopswere pulled out of Vietnam. Among my duty assignments were with the 24th,82nd and the TOPO command in West Germany.
I think I've an earned right tojudge the president's military record, or lack thereof.President's Clinton management of the military seemed to be good enough to establish the best military in the history of the world and was well used-orabused-by president Bush. More to the point and has been well documented,Bush is close to destroying the Army I served for so long.
I suggest you visit Army Times to see what the troops are saying. As we used to say in the NCO club, if you've got a free stake, it's easy toplay.
Bush has never, ever put himself on the line, and that is the simpletruth. And while I'll miss the "left wing' convention, in Boston, I mighttry to make the "right wing" one in New York. My uniform still fits very well.
Best regards,
Peter J. Roberts
Editor and Publisher
Newenglandwow.com
Tuesday, July 13, 2004
Not felt this bad since Nixon
I am again dog tired and getting ready to go back to work tonight at 11:30 but things are getting out of hand and I am sick and tired of reading about our right wing president making nice for his war.
What I find most amazing is that anyone could think of voting for him or any of his supporters. They, and he, are either so selfish or just plane stupid.
I'm going to sleep as it is nearly four and raining like all get out. On sunny days I take the cats outside but they are decidely not too keen on the rain.
I wonder whom I'm I writing to?
What I find most amazing is that anyone could think of voting for him or any of his supporters. They, and he, are either so selfish or just plane stupid.
I'm going to sleep as it is nearly four and raining like all get out. On sunny days I take the cats outside but they are decidely not too keen on the rain.
I wonder whom I'm I writing to?
Friday, July 09, 2004
The New York Times > National > Report Says Key Assertions Leading to War Were Wrong
The New York Times > National > Report Says Key Assertions Leading to War Were Wrong: "In a scathing, unanimous report, the Senate Intelligence Committee said Friday that the most pivotal assessments used to justify the war against Iraq were unfounded and unreasonable, and reflected major missteps on the part of American intelligence agencies."
So say what you want about Moore and "9/11", as no doubt many will, the truth is we went to war in Iraq for the stated reasons by President Bush that were not even close to the truth.
I've got to go to work tonoight but there is no better reason for sending Bush back to Texas than his failure to safeguard the Country. If you can't get a war right, what else are you screwing up?
So say what you want about Moore and "9/11", as no doubt many will, the truth is we went to war in Iraq for the stated reasons by President Bush that were not even close to the truth.
I've got to go to work tonoight but there is no better reason for sending Bush back to Texas than his failure to safeguard the Country. If you can't get a war right, what else are you screwing up?
Sunday, July 04, 2004
The struggle for sovereignty
The struggle for sovereignty
Democracy in Europe grew out of popular action against unrepresentative rule; the resistance in Iraq is part of the same story
Karma Nabulsi
Wednesday June 23, 2004
The Guardian
The United States and Britain claim to be handing sovereignty to Iraq next week. In fact, the occupying power cannot legally transfer sovereignty on June 30 for one simple reason: it does not possess it. Sovereignty is vested in the Iraqi people, and always has been: before Saddam Hussein, after him, under the martial law of the American proconsul Paul Bremer today.
This fact is reflected in the language of the most recent UN resolution - 1546, on June 8 - as well as previous ones, all of which "reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". The constant need of George Bush and Tony Blair to claim sovereignty reflects more than a misunderstanding of the laws of war and basic international law. It demonstrates an alarming ignorance of the democratic structures of the very countries they were elected to represent. This ignorance also provides us with some clues as to why they have no understanding either of what they are doing in Iraq, or what is happening on the ground there.
When the formal apparatus of a state crumbles during invasion and occupation, and authority is exercised by a foreign military power, sovereignty returns to its bearers, a country's citizens. Sovereignty is vested in the people, and not in the apparatus of state. This is the fundamental principle from which modern democracies draw their legitimacy, and the basis for all representative government. It is also the cornerstone of modern international law.
This doctrine of popular sovereignty has been set out in classical texts and in the modern era, most famously by philosophers such as John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. It can be seen in the constitutions and founding documents of the French and American revolutions, and of representative international institutions such as the UN.
Yet these are not abstract theories of state. They reflect a solid custom of political engagement that dates from the emergence of democratic systems in 18th-century Europe. It is only because of this custom of resistance and the collective practices of popular sovereignty by generations of ordinary people that these principles are now embedded in every democratic legal system and governing institution. It is from this tradition of resistance to unrepresentative rule that Europe draws its own democratic culture, its notion and practice of citizenship, public space and political activism, and the role and responsibilities of the state.
It was the principle of popular sovereignty that was fought for by generations of Europeans from the late 18th century and throughout the 19th in order to establish democracies in the face of foreign military conquest and imperial rule. It was equally this principle that guided the actions and legitimacy of the underground resistance and the allies in the second world war, and it is the very same principle that guides the resistance today in Palestine and Iraq. Democracy is a product of these struggles, and moreover this historical practice is itself the essence of popular sovereignty in action, its very articulation.
The quest for representative government was at the heart of the battle against a variety of unrepresentative regimes in 19th-century Europe: the Polish struggle for emancipation against the Russian and Prussian armies in the 18th and 19th centuries; the Russian partisans who fought Napoleon's army and later the Nazi invaders; Italian republicans such as Mazzini and Carlo Bianco who fought underground with republican associations for more than 30 years against the Austrian empire and the papal states; the popular resistance in India to British rule; the political and military resistance in South Africa. All characterise a single political tradition, that of popular sovereignty.
These customs of active engagement by citizens to free and rule themselves illustrate two important historical lessons that tie us to the present relationship between an occupier and an occupied people. The first is that the struggle for liberty is universal, not imported, and emerged from concrete historical conflicts. The second is that today's democratic institutions are the product of these very struggles.
The most important lesson of our common history is that those organised political engagements against injustice are what created the political culture that ensured the stability of the democratic institutions that emerged.
It is not only after one possesses democratic institutions that one practices democracy, nor is democracy merely a set of institutions or mechanisms such as elections. Democracy only holds if it emerges by customary practice in the public sphere, and in the case of Europe this custom developed through organised resistance to unrepresentative rule over generations.
So the popular struggle for liberty has been, in the case of established democracies in Europe, the necessary route to gain those liberties, and to hold them. All the rights enjoyed today across Europe were hard won by political mobilisation, imprisonment and armed resistance, by organisational structures working underground for a common purpose at great risk over generations.
This common purpose did not emanate from above, from bureaucrats or technocrats, from the minds of political theorists or commentators, from the "transfer" of democratic ideas, liberal armies or even Rousseau.
The young men who defended Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank and Rafah refugee camp in Gaza, and who recently won back the Iraqi cities of Falluja and Najaf from the occupying power, are not the terrorists - or the enemies of democracy. They are our own past torchbearers, the founding citizens of popular sovereignty and democratic practice, the very tradition that freed Europe and that we honoured on D-day.
ยท Karma Nabulsi is a research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. Her book Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law is published in paperback this summer by OUP
director.civitas@nuf.ox.ac.uk
Dear Ms. Nabulsi
From across the pond in New England, a "thank you" for your thoughts on sovereignty.
As an American who opposed the war in Iraq as well as the president who proposed and started it, I can tell you there is the growing sense here that something is missing in the solutions we've heard about ending our involvement in the country. People can't put their finger on it but we "feel" something is very wrong. A few weeks ago I read a quote from a young soldier who was commenting on the street fighters in Iraq...it went something along the lines of "If some foreigners came to our town to set up shop and take things over, we'd do the same."
I believe we both would call that popular sovereignty. And as you identified and wrote about in the Guardian, that is exactly what is missing in latest plan for Iraq and what more Americans "feel" is missing. Under similar circumstances, as we did back in 1776, we would do the same.
Also as you say, this comes from the bottom up. Sovereignty is granted by the collective "understanding" or "feeling" if you will, of the people to grant or allow certain things to happen around them. They allow themselves, and thus all others, to be imposed upon by the larger whole.
In the theatre, the audience allows the willing suspension of disbelief. In real nations, not the concocted variety, the audience (the people) allows for the willing suspension of personal will so that each may play a part in the larger drama. If they don't willingly suspend their "will" then the play can not go on. There are just too many actors on too many stages.
Thank you again for your thoughts. While it is too early to say there is a groundswell, I think some of your ideas are beginning to sink in over here. Let's hope so.
Best regards,
Peter Roberts
New London, CT USA
Peter J. Roberts
Editor and Publisher
Newenglandwow.com
Democracy in Europe grew out of popular action against unrepresentative rule; the resistance in Iraq is part of the same story
Karma Nabulsi
Wednesday June 23, 2004
The Guardian
The United States and Britain claim to be handing sovereignty to Iraq next week. In fact, the occupying power cannot legally transfer sovereignty on June 30 for one simple reason: it does not possess it. Sovereignty is vested in the Iraqi people, and always has been: before Saddam Hussein, after him, under the martial law of the American proconsul Paul Bremer today.
This fact is reflected in the language of the most recent UN resolution - 1546, on June 8 - as well as previous ones, all of which "reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". The constant need of George Bush and Tony Blair to claim sovereignty reflects more than a misunderstanding of the laws of war and basic international law. It demonstrates an alarming ignorance of the democratic structures of the very countries they were elected to represent. This ignorance also provides us with some clues as to why they have no understanding either of what they are doing in Iraq, or what is happening on the ground there.
When the formal apparatus of a state crumbles during invasion and occupation, and authority is exercised by a foreign military power, sovereignty returns to its bearers, a country's citizens. Sovereignty is vested in the people, and not in the apparatus of state. This is the fundamental principle from which modern democracies draw their legitimacy, and the basis for all representative government. It is also the cornerstone of modern international law.
This doctrine of popular sovereignty has been set out in classical texts and in the modern era, most famously by philosophers such as John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. It can be seen in the constitutions and founding documents of the French and American revolutions, and of representative international institutions such as the UN.
Yet these are not abstract theories of state. They reflect a solid custom of political engagement that dates from the emergence of democratic systems in 18th-century Europe. It is only because of this custom of resistance and the collective practices of popular sovereignty by generations of ordinary people that these principles are now embedded in every democratic legal system and governing institution. It is from this tradition of resistance to unrepresentative rule that Europe draws its own democratic culture, its notion and practice of citizenship, public space and political activism, and the role and responsibilities of the state.
It was the principle of popular sovereignty that was fought for by generations of Europeans from the late 18th century and throughout the 19th in order to establish democracies in the face of foreign military conquest and imperial rule. It was equally this principle that guided the actions and legitimacy of the underground resistance and the allies in the second world war, and it is the very same principle that guides the resistance today in Palestine and Iraq. Democracy is a product of these struggles, and moreover this historical practice is itself the essence of popular sovereignty in action, its very articulation.
The quest for representative government was at the heart of the battle against a variety of unrepresentative regimes in 19th-century Europe: the Polish struggle for emancipation against the Russian and Prussian armies in the 18th and 19th centuries; the Russian partisans who fought Napoleon's army and later the Nazi invaders; Italian republicans such as Mazzini and Carlo Bianco who fought underground with republican associations for more than 30 years against the Austrian empire and the papal states; the popular resistance in India to British rule; the political and military resistance in South Africa. All characterise a single political tradition, that of popular sovereignty.
These customs of active engagement by citizens to free and rule themselves illustrate two important historical lessons that tie us to the present relationship between an occupier and an occupied people. The first is that the struggle for liberty is universal, not imported, and emerged from concrete historical conflicts. The second is that today's democratic institutions are the product of these very struggles.
The most important lesson of our common history is that those organised political engagements against injustice are what created the political culture that ensured the stability of the democratic institutions that emerged.
It is not only after one possesses democratic institutions that one practices democracy, nor is democracy merely a set of institutions or mechanisms such as elections. Democracy only holds if it emerges by customary practice in the public sphere, and in the case of Europe this custom developed through organised resistance to unrepresentative rule over generations.
So the popular struggle for liberty has been, in the case of established democracies in Europe, the necessary route to gain those liberties, and to hold them. All the rights enjoyed today across Europe were hard won by political mobilisation, imprisonment and armed resistance, by organisational structures working underground for a common purpose at great risk over generations.
This common purpose did not emanate from above, from bureaucrats or technocrats, from the minds of political theorists or commentators, from the "transfer" of democratic ideas, liberal armies or even Rousseau.
The young men who defended Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank and Rafah refugee camp in Gaza, and who recently won back the Iraqi cities of Falluja and Najaf from the occupying power, are not the terrorists - or the enemies of democracy. They are our own past torchbearers, the founding citizens of popular sovereignty and democratic practice, the very tradition that freed Europe and that we honoured on D-day.
ยท Karma Nabulsi is a research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. Her book Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law is published in paperback this summer by OUP
director.civitas@nuf.ox.ac.uk
Dear Ms. Nabulsi
From across the pond in New England, a "thank you" for your thoughts on sovereignty.
As an American who opposed the war in Iraq as well as the president who proposed and started it, I can tell you there is the growing sense here that something is missing in the solutions we've heard about ending our involvement in the country. People can't put their finger on it but we "feel" something is very wrong. A few weeks ago I read a quote from a young soldier who was commenting on the street fighters in Iraq...it went something along the lines of "If some foreigners came to our town to set up shop and take things over, we'd do the same."
I believe we both would call that popular sovereignty. And as you identified and wrote about in the Guardian, that is exactly what is missing in latest plan for Iraq and what more Americans "feel" is missing. Under similar circumstances, as we did back in 1776, we would do the same.
Also as you say, this comes from the bottom up. Sovereignty is granted by the collective "understanding" or "feeling" if you will, of the people to grant or allow certain things to happen around them. They allow themselves, and thus all others, to be imposed upon by the larger whole.
In the theatre, the audience allows the willing suspension of disbelief. In real nations, not the concocted variety, the audience (the people) allows for the willing suspension of personal will so that each may play a part in the larger drama. If they don't willingly suspend their "will" then the play can not go on. There are just too many actors on too many stages.
Thank you again for your thoughts. While it is too early to say there is a groundswell, I think some of your ideas are beginning to sink in over here. Let's hope so.
Best regards,
Peter Roberts
New London, CT USA
Peter J. Roberts
Editor and Publisher
Newenglandwow.com
